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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
(West Jordan City), 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
BRUCE S. ROBERTSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over 
interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a first degree or capital felony. Utah Code 
Ann, § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1993). This Court granted 
Mr. Robertson's petition for interlocutory review on December 22, 
1993. A copy of the order granting interlocutory review is 
contained in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
West Jordan City originally cited Defendant Bruce S. 
Robertson with violations of city ordinances and charged him in the 
Justice Court with violations of such ordinances. R. 50, 170. The 
city prosecutor filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice in the 
Justice Court, then filed the Information in the Circuit Court. The 
Information filed in Circuit Court contained four charges: Driving 
Under the Influence of Alcohol, a class B misdemeanor, in violation 
Case No. 930728-CA 
Prioritv No. 2 
of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Repl. 1993); Driving on a Revoked 
License, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-2-136(3) (Repl. 1993); Reckless Driving, a class B misdemeanor, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-136(3) (Repl. 1993); and 
Fleeing from an Officer, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (Repl. 1993). 
Mr. Robertson moved to dismiss all four charges and filed a 
supporting memorandum, claiming that Article VIII, Section 16 of the 
Utah Constitution precluded the city from prosecuting the charges. 
R. 26-33, 34. A copy of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is contained 
in Addendum B. Following a hearing on July 19, 1993, the trial 
judge denied Defendants Motion to Dismiss. R. 98-103, 169-176. 
The trial court issued its written "Order Denying Defendant#s Motion 
to Dismiss and Upholding Constitutionality of Statute" on 
November 1, 1991. A copy of that order is contained in Addendum C. 
Mr. Robertson also filed a "Motion to Suppress Custodial 
Statements" (R. 38-9), a "Motion in Limine to Suppress Evidence of 
Prior Convictions" (R. 40), and a "Motion to Suppress Illegal 
Warrantless Search" (R. 36-7). The trial court has not yet heard 
these motions. 
Following the trial court's denial of Appellant's Motion to 
Dismiss, this court granted Defendant's petition for interlocutory 
review. R. 109. 
- 2 
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES, RULES AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (Supp. 1992) states: 
In cities with a city attorney, the city attorney 
may prosecute violations of city ordinances, and 
under state law, infractions and misdemeanors 
occurring within the boundaries of the 
municipality and has the same powers in respect 
to the violations as are exercised by a county 
attorney including, but not limited to, granting 
immunity to witnesses. The city attorney shall 
represent the interests of the state or the 
municipality in the appeal of any matter 
prosecuted in any trial court by the city 
attorney. 
The former version of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (Supp. 
1990) states: 
(1) The city attorney may prosecute 
violations of city ordinances and has the same 
powers in respect to violations of city 
ordinances as are exercised by a county attorney 
in respect to violations of state law, including, 
but not limited to, granting immunity to 
witnesses for violations of city ordinances. 
(2) The city attorney may be sworn as a 
deputy public prosecutor by the attorney general, 
the county attorney of the county in which the 
city is situated, or any other public prosecutor 
having jurisdiction within the city limits. 
Appointments as deputy public prosecutor shall be 
for a period of time as specified at the time of 
oath taking but shall not exceed one year and 
shall be subject to renewal. Upon such oath, the 
city attorney may prosecute, in the name of the 
state of Utah, any class A misdemeanor enumerated 
as such by the Legislature and committed within 
the territorial limits of the city. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1(a) (Supp. 1993) states in 
pertinent part: 
In each county which is not within a prosecution 
district, the county attorney is a public 
prosecutor and shall: 
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(a) conduct on behalf of the state all 
prosecutions for public offenses committed 
within the county, except for prosecutions 
undertaken by the city attorney under 
Section 10-3-928 and appeals from them. 
Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah Constitution states: 
The Legislature shall provide for a system of 
public prosecutors who shall have primary 
responsibility for the prosecution of criminal 
actions brought in the name of the State of Utah 
and shall perform such other duties as may be 
provided by statute. Public prosecutors shall be 
elected in the manner provided by statute and 
shall be admitted to practice law in Utah. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Does the provision of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (Repl. 1992) 
which states that unelected city attorneys may prosecute misdemeanors 
and infractions violate Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah 
Constitution? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A constitutional challenge to a statute presents a question 
of law; thus, this Court reviews the trial court's conclusion for 
correctness. State v. Davis, 787 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah App. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts giving rise to the criminal charges are not 
relevant to the issue raised in this case. No evidence has been 
taken regarding the underlying facts. 
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As set forth in the Statement of the Case, West Jordan City 
filed an Information in April 1993 charging Bruce Robertson with 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Repl. 1993); Driving on a 
Revoked License, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-2-136(3) (Repl. 1993); Reckless Driving, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-136(3) (Repl. 
1993) ; and Fleeing from an Officer, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (Repl. 1993). 
Mr. Robertson moved to dismiss the charges, claiming that 
the unelected West Jordan City prosecutor could not prosecute 
misdemeanors pursuant to Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah 
Constitution. R. 34. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (Supp. 
1992) violates Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah Constitution. 
The statute permits an unelected city attorney to prosecute state 
misdemeanors despite the constitutional requirement that an elected 
public prosecutor have primary responsibility for prosecuting state 
crimes. The grant of authority to city attorneys transfers the 
elected prosecutor's responsibilities to an appointed individual 
whose actions are not overseen by an elected public prosecutor, in 
violation of Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah Constitution. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT. PROSECUTION OF STATE MISDEMEANOR CHARGES BY 
AN UNELECTED CITY PROSECUTOR VIOLATES ARTICLE VIII, 
SECTION 16 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
In the present case, the unelected West Jordan City 
prosecutor filed State class A and class B misdemeanor charges 
against Appellant/Defendant Bruce Robertson. R. 1-2. The trial 
court concluded that Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (Supp. 1992) gave the 
West Jordan City prosecutor the ability to prosecute State 
misdemeanors. The trial judge also concluded that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-3-928 did not violate Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah 
Constitution. R. 98-103; see Addendum C. 
Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah Constitution requires: 
The Legislature shall provide for a system of 
public prosecutors who shall have primary 
responsibility for the prosecution of criminal 
actions brought in the name of the state of Utah 
and shall perform such other duties as may be 
provided by statute. Public prosecutors shall be 
elected in a manner provided by statute, and 
shall be admitted to the practice of law. 
(emphasis added)• 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (Supp. 1992) states: 
In cities with a city attorney, the city attorney 
may prosecute violations of city ordinances, and 
under state law, infractions and misdemeanors 
occurring within the boundaries of the 
municipality and has the same powers in respect 
to the violations as are exercised by a county 
attorney, including, but not limited to, granting 
immunity to witnesses. 
(emphasis added). 
A statute must be declared unconstitutional where a 
reviewing court cannot reasonably interpret the language to fit 
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within constitutional framework. State v. Davis# 787 P.2d at 519; 
Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983). While statutes are 
given a presumption of validity, a statute must nevertheless be 
stricken where it cannot be given a limiting construction which 
passes constitutional muster. See City of St. George v. Turner, 860 
P.2d 929, 936 (Utah 1993) (an ordinance "may be unconstitutionally 
overbroad unless it is construed narrowly to pass constitutional 
muster. [citations omitted]."); Id. (Zimmerman, J., dissenting) 
(ordinance is unconstitutional since plain language cannot be 
construed to make statute constitutional). 
Despite the preference for construing a statute to fit 
within constitutional guidelines, clear and unambiguous language 
must be held to mean what it clearly expresses. See Johnson v. Utah 
State Retirement Board, 770 P.2d 93, 95 (Utah 1988) ("A fundamental 
principle of statutory construction is that unambiguous language in 
the statute itself may not be interpreted so as to contradict its 
plain meaning); Sutherland's Statutory Construction, § 46.01 (3d ed. 
1943) . 
In other words, the plain language of a statute or 
constitutional provision controls. See Provo City v. Willden, 768 
P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1989). Courts are not free to "rewrite a 
statute or ignore its plain language in order to reach a 
constitutional construction." City of Logan v. Huber, 786 P.2d 
1372, 1377 (Utah App. 1990); see also State v. Archuletta, 526 P.2d 
911, 912 (Utah 1974) (court cannot create a crime where plain and 
unambiguous language of statute repealed prior statutes and 
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abolished that crime). Hence, where the plain language of a statute 
violates a constitutional provision, the court must be declare the 
statute unconstitutional. 
Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah Constitution requires 
that elected public prosecutors have primary responsibility for 
prosecuting state crimes. The Utah Legislature has set up a system 
of public prosecutors by establishing elected county attorneys and 
an elected Attorney General. See Utah Code Ann. § 67-5-1 (Repl. 
1993); Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1 (Supp. 1993). The Legislature 
vested prosecutorial authority in the Attorney General and gave the 
Attorney General supervisory power over county attorneys. Utah Code 
Ann. § 67-5-1(5) (Supp. 1993). This system fits within the 
requirement of Article VIII, Section 16 that an elected public 
prosecutor have primary responsibility for prosecuting state 
crimes. See generally State v. Winne, 189 N.W. 119, 120 (S.D. 1922) 
(deputy state attorney can carry out duties of constitutionally 
established state's attorney). 
By contrast, no statute exists which gives the elected 
Attorney General or county attorney supervisory power over the city 
prosecutor. A city attorney derives his or her power to prosecute 
state misdemeanors from Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (Supp. 1992). 
That statute fails to make the city prosecutor accountable to an 
elected public prosecutor (and ultimately the electorate) and 
therefore violates the constitutional requirement that an elected 
public prosecutor have primary responsibility. 
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The former version of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (Supp. 
1990) required that a city attorney "be sworn as a deputy public 
prosecutor11 by the attorney general, the county attorney of the 
county in which the city is situated, or any other public prosecutor 
having jurisdiction within the city limits" in order to prosecute 
state class A misdemeanors. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (Supp. 
1990). This former requirement that the city attorney be sworn as a 
deputy public prosecutor appears to have been an attempt to comply 
with Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah Constitution. The 
requirement that the city attorney be sworn as a deputy public 
prosecutor is not included in the current version of the statute. 
The trial court relied on Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1 (Supp. 
1993) in support of its conclusion that Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 is 
constitutional. R. 100-101; see Addendum C. Contrary to the trial 
court's conclusion, a review of Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1 further 
demonstrates the unconstitutionality of Utah Code Ann § 10-3-928. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1(a) (Supp. 1993) states in pertinent part: 
In each county which is not within a prosecution 
district, the county attorney is a public 
prosecutor and shall: 
(a) conduct on behalf of the state all 
prosecutions for public offenses committed 
within the county, except for prosecutions 
undertaken by the city attorney under 
Section 10-3-928 and appeals from them. 
The language of Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1 (Supp. 1993), when 
read in conjunction with Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (Supp. 1992), 
appears to give city attorneys primary authority for prosecuting 
misdemeanors and infractions under the state code. The language 
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suggests that the elected county attorney can prosecute only when a 
city declines to prosecute a misdemeanor or infraction. It also 
suggests that a city attorney is free to prosecute any misdemeanor 
regardless of whether the elected public prosecutor determines that 
the crime should be charged. Giving such uncontrolled discretion 
and primary responsibility to a city attorney invades and undermines 
the constitutionally mandated authority given elected prosecutors. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that prosecutors 
exercise discretion in deciding whether to file charges and, if so, 
the nature of the charges to be filed. State v. Bellf 785 P.2d 390, 
402-3 (Utah 1989). Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (Supp. 1992) passes 
this discretion to unelected city attorneys who are not accountable 
to the electorate but who might be susceptible to pressures from 
mayors or city council people. The statute effectively removes 
geographic areas from the elected public prosecutor's jurisdiction. 
This ability of city prosecutors to exercise discretion without 
accountability to the electorate coupled with the removal of cities 
from the public prosecutor's constitutionally mandated 
responsibilities underscores the unconstitutionality of this statute. 
The trial judge interpreted the "primary responsibility" 
language of Article VIII, Section 16 to mean that elected 
prosecutors have "the first, the principal, the chief or leading 
responsibility of prosecutors to prosecute criminal actions." 
R. 102. The trial court concluded, however, that such 
responsibility is not exclusive. According to the trial court, 
Article VIII, Section 16 "does not preclude the legislature" from 
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giving appointed city prosecutors "limited responsibility in 
prosecution." R. 102. 
As previously outlined, Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-928 and 
17-8-1 appear to give the city attorneys initial or primary 
discretion as to whether to prosecute state misdemeanors and 
infractions, in violation of Article VIII, Section 16. In addition, 
"primary responsibility" does not mean "first crack" at the 
prosecution. Instead, it means chief or principal control or 
authority over the prosecution.1 This necessarily includes the 
authority to oversee all state prosecutions. Hence, Article VIII, 
Section 16 requires that the elected prosecutor have the authority 
to oversee all state prosecutions, not that it have the "first 
crack" at filing. 
The Utah Attorney General's Office issued an Informal 
Opinion No. 92-16 on December 4, 1992 addressing the issue raised in 
this case. R. 16-22; see Addendum D for a copy of that letter. The 
Attorney General concluded that 
. . . § 10-3-928 which purports to empower city 
attorneys, who are not elected prosecutors, to 
prosecute state criminal actions, and to do so 
without being responsible to any elected 
prosecutor concerning such state criminal 
actions, violates the Utah constitution. 
R. 22. 
1. Webster's Dictionary, 1211 (2d ed. 1976, 1974) defines 
"responsibility" as "accountability" or "a thing . . . for [which] 
one is responsible." "Responsible" is defined as "accountable," 
"answerable." Webster's Dictionary, 1129 (2d ed. 1976, 1974) 
defines "primary" as "chief" or "principal." 
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The Informal Opinion letter points out further: 
The problem with section 10-3-928 is that it 
gives broad general authority to city attorneys 
who are appointed rather than elected (Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-3-902) to exercise the powers of public 
prosecutors by prosecuting infractions and 
misdemeanors under state law; that is, 
prosecuting in the name of the State of Utah. 
Thus, under Section 10-3-928, a city attorney 
derives the power to prosecute state offenses 
directly from the statute, rather than by being a 
delegee of, and under the supervision of, a 
public prosecutor. 
R. 18. 
An additional problem is that "the statute grants 
prosecutorial authority to a city attorney whether or not the county 
attorney consents." R. 18. Hence, city attorneys prosecuting state 
misdemeanors are not under the supervision or control of elected 
public prosecutors, as required by Article VIII, Section 16. 
A number of jurisdictions have reached the conclusion that 
similar constitutional provisions require that an elected official 
oversee the activity. See Informal Opinion letter at R. 18-20 
citing cases from other jurisdictions. In Ex parte Corliss, 114 
N.W. 962 (N.D. 1907), the court held "that the legislature could not 
deprive a constitutional officer of the power and functions 
conferred by the Constitution and vest them in an officer of its own 
creation." Winne, 189 N.W. at 120. In Corliss, the court struck 
down the legislatively created position of "enforcement 
commissioner." The Corliss court pointed out that the state 
constitution required that the activity delegated to the enforcement 
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commissioner be conducted by an elected official. In striking the 
legislation, the court reasoned: 
If these constitutional offices can be stripped 
of a portion of the inherent functions thereof, 
they can be stripped of all such functions, and 
the same can be vested in newly created 
appointive officers, and the will of the framers 
of the Constitution thereby thwarted. 
Corliss, 114 N.W. at 964. 
In Murphy v. Yates, 348 A.2d 837, 844 (Md. Ct. App. 1975), 
the court determined that "the office of the state's attorney is a 
constitutional office" and that the legislature could not dilute or 
abrogate those powers. See also In re House of Representatives, 575 
A.2d 176 (R.I. 1990) (transfer of power from constitutionally 
established elected Attorney General to public prosecutor violates 
state constitution); State Board of Dental Examiners v. Brickham, 
203 S.W.2d 563, 566 (Tex. 1947) (constitutional authority of county 
or district attorney to represent state in trial courts cannot be 
abridged or taken away; no other person may represent state "unless 
such officer joins therein"); City of Baton Rouge v. Short, 345 
So.2d 37, 40 (La. 1977) (statute which allows city prosecutor to 
pursue driving while intoxicated charges violates state 
constitutional provision which "vests the district attorney or his 
designated assistance with the exclusive charge of every criminal 
prosecution by the state"). 
In contrast with a city attorney, the actions of a deputy 
state's attorney do not violate the constitutional requirement that 
an elected prosecutor pursue criminal prosecutions. Winne, 189 N.W. 
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at 120. A deputy state's attorney is supervised by an elected 
official and his acts are those of the elected prosecutor. 
A deputy state's attorney does not fill a new 
office created by statute, and is not endowed 
with functions usurped from those of the 
constitutional officer. His acts are those of 
the constitutional officer . . . . 
Wirme, 189 N.W. at 120. See also People v. Kessler, 183 N.Y.S.2d 
834, 835 (N.Y. 1959) (District Attorney can delegate his authority 
to prosecute "although he may assume full and complete control of 
same at any time he deems it advisable"). Hence, the attorney 
general or county attorney can employ deputies without running afoul 
of Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah Constitution. 
Because city attorneys are neither elected nor supervised 
by elected public prosecutors, they cannot prosecute state criminal 
charges without violating the Utah Constitution. In this case, 
where a city prosecutor has filed state misdemeanor charges against 
Mr. Robertson, the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the 
charges.2 
2. West Jordan City claimed in the trial court that Mr. Robertson 
did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-3-928 because he had not shown "how he specifically 
will be Adversely affected.'" R. 74. In Provo City v. Willden, 
768 P.2d 455, 457 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
One aspect of general standing doctrine we share 
with federal courts is the basic requirement that 
the complainant show "'some distinct and palpable 
injury that gives him [or her] a personal stake 
in 'the outcome of the legal dispute.'" 
[citations omitted]. 
See also Davis, 787 P.2d at 524 (parties' rights must be 
"specifically affected" in order to have standing to challenge a 
statute). 
(continued) 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
trial judge's order denying his Motion to Dismiss. 
SUBMITTED this JIS4L day of May, 1994. 
^ta^c.idm 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
\&k <£& 
SUSAN M. DENHARDT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
(footnote 2 continued) 
Mr. Robertson's rights are directly affected by the city's 
prosecution of this case. In the event this Court concludes that 
the charges should be dismissed, the prosecution against 
Mr. Robertson will end. Hence, he has a personal stake in this 
dispute. 
Many cases holding that a state constitutional provision 
precludes an unelected prosecutor from prosecuting state charges 
arose in similar criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Winne, 189 N.W. 
at 119 (defendant in criminal case moved for arrest of judgment, 
claiming f,the information was invalid, and the court was without 
jurisdiction to try the accused"); City of Baton Rouge v. Short, 345 
So.2d at 38 (defendant objected to prosecution by city attorney, 
claiming that state constitution "vests district attorney with 
exclusive charge of every criminal prosecution by the state"); 
People v. Kesslerf 183 N.Y.S.2d at 835 (defendant appealed 
conviction, claiming that information should be dismissed). The 
issue of whether the city could file the information in this case 
goes to the heart of the trial court's jurisdiction over this 
matter. Hence, Mr. Robertson has standing to raise this issue. 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be 
delivered eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake city, Utah 84102, 
and four copies to Greg Curtis, West Jordan City Prosecutor, 8000 S. 
Redwood Rd., West Jordan, Utah, 84088, this A$-kjL day of May, 1994. 
<ftkj(Ld)cQ/ 
JOAN C. WATT 
21 DELIVERED t h i s J J d a y o f May, 199,4 . 
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ADDENDUM A 
iW THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooooo 0£C 2 "' '*""' 
State of Utah, " ™ 
Plaintiff
 and Appellee, ? — '^ZfC^Oz. 
v. 
Bruce s. Robertson, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER «/• "••=•/r7'•••• 
Case No. 930728-CA 
This matter is before the court on a petition.for 
permission to appeal from an interlocutory order. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is granted. All 
proceedings subsequent shall be as, and within the time 
required, for appeals from final judgments. Utah R. App. P. 
5(e). 
Dated this 22nd day of December, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
ADDENDUM B 
SUSAN M. DENHARDT, #5943 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
1- rt-43 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, WEST JORDAN CITY DEPARTMENT 
WEST JORDAN CITY FOR THE 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
BRUCE S. ROBERTSON, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE BASIS 
THAT WEST JORDAN CITY PROSECUTOR 
LACKS AUTHORITY TO PROSECUTE 
MISDEMEANORS UNDER THE STATE 
CODE 
Case No. 935003953TC 
JUDGE EDWARD A. WATSON 
Defendant, BRUCE S. ROBERTSON, by and through counsel, 
SUSAN M. DENHARDT, hereby moves this court to dismiss the charges 
of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, Driving on a Revoked 
License, Reckless Driving, and Fleeing from an Officer, filed 
against Mr. Robertson. Defendant seeks this dismissal on the basis 
that the West Jordan City Prosecutor, Greg Curtis, is prohibited 
under the Utah Constitution Article VII, Section 16 from 
prosecuting state code charges. 
DATED this /9*- day of July, 1993. 
t&irSte. 
SUSAN M. DENHARDT 
Attorney for Defendant 
ADDENDUM C 
Greg J. Curtis (#4974) 
West Jordan Assistant City Attorney 
8000 South Redwood Road 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
Telephone: 569-5140 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN AND FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
STATE 
(by 
vs 
BRUCE 
OF UTAH, 
West Jordan City) 
Plaintiff, 
S. ROBERTSON, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
: MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
UPHOLDING CONSTITUTIONALITY 
: OF STATUTE 
Case No. 935003953 TC 
Judge Edward A. Watson 
The Court finds that the defendant, Bruce S. Robertson, 
was initially charged by citation in the West Jordan City Justice 
Court with some infractions of law. These infractions of law 
occurred within the West Jordan City limits. The original 
charges were subsequently dismissed, without prejudice, and 
charges were brought, four in number, in the Third Circuit Court, 
which are: Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol in violation 
of §41-6-44, a class "B" misdemeanor; Driving on Revocation in 
violation of §41-2-136.3, a class "B,f misdemeanor; Reckless 
Driving in violation of §41-6-45, a class f,B" misdemeanor; and 
Fleeing from a Police Officer in violation of §41-6-13.5, a class 
"A" misdemeanor. 
1 
The defense filed a Motion to Dismiss relying upon the 
Utah Attorney General's Informal Opinion, No, 92-16, opining that 
§10-3-928 of the Utah Code violated Article VIII, Section 16 of 
the Utah Constitution in that §10-3-928 provides prosecutorial 
authority in city attorneys who are not elected under the 
provisions of Article VIII, Section 16, of the Utah Constitution. 
The Court allowed both parties to submit written memorandum prior 
to oral argument and after having considered the arguments and 
memoranda of each party 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
The constitutional provision that applies to this case is 
Article VIII, Section 16, which provides: 
The Legislature shall provide for a system of 
public prosecutors who shall have primary 
responsibility for the prosecution of criminal 
actions brought in the name of the State of Utah 
and shall perform such other duties as may be 
provided by statute. Public prosecutors shall be 
elected in a manner provided by statute, and shall 
be admitted to practice law in Utah. 
The city prosecutor bringing this action claims to have 
authority provided to him under §10-3-928 of the Utah Code, which 
states: 
In cities with a city attorney, the city attorney 
may prosecute violations of city ordinances, and 
under state law, infractions and misdemeanors 
occurring within the boundaries of the municipality 
and has the same powers in respect to the 
violations as are exercised by a county attorney or 
district attorney, including, but not limited to, 
granting immunity to witnesses. The city attorney 
shall represent the interests of the state or the 
municipality in the appeal of any matter 
prosecuted in any trial court by the city attorney. 
2 
This provision of the state code was amended in 1992. The 
amendment deleted out a provision which provided for a system 
whereby city attorneys could be deputized by county attorneys, 
leaving only the section quoted by the Court. 
The Legislature has also adopted a provision under §17-18-
1 of the Utah Code which defines the powers and duties of county 
attorneys. Section 17-18-1, as amended in 1993, provides, in 
part: 
In each county which is not within a prosecution 
district, the county attorney is a public 
prosecutor and shall: 
(a) conduct on behalf of the state all 
prosecutions for public offenses committed within 
the county, except for prosecutions undertaken by 
the city attorney under Section 10-3-928 and 
appeals from them; 
In State v. Davis. 787 P.2d 517 (Utah App. 1990) the Utah 
Court of Appeals reiterated certain rules of statutory 
construction to use when there is a constitutional challenge to a 
statute. The Court of Appeals set down certain principles that 
must be followed when determining the constitutionality of a 
statute. In recognizing that it is the prerogative of the 
Legislature to create the law, the Utah Court of Appeals and the 
Utah Supreme Court have held that legislative enactments, such as 
§10-3-928, have a presumption of validity. The Court therefore 
presumes that §10-3-928 is valid. Utah appellate courts have 
further held that the courts will not strike down a statute 
unless it appears to be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The defendant has the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that §10-3-928 is unconstitutional. The 
3 
Supreme Court has further stated that it will not declare a 
statute unconstitutional if the statute can be found by any 
reasonable basis to be brought within the constitutional 
framework. 
The Court finds that there is the possibility of bringing 
§10-3-928 within the constitutional framework and thus give 
validity and constitutionality to the statute. The system 
established by the Legislature is a combination of city, county 
and district attorneys. The question is whether the system 
provided for by the Legislature pursuant to the constitution is 
valid. Do all of the attorneys in the prosecution system 
established by the Legislature have to be elected? 
The position of the defense is that under whatever system 
the Legislature provides public prosecutors have to be elected. 
Thus prosecutors are in some way answerable, even though they 
may be deputy attorneys, to an elected official. 
The Court is going to bring §10-3-928 into an 
interpretation of constitutionality, and the framework of the 
constitution, by interpreting the system the Legislature has 
established in this state. The Court finds that the Legislature 
through enacting §10-3-928, as well as §17-18-1 and other 
statutes where city attorneys have been allowed to prosecute 
intended to exercise their constitutional directive to provide 
for a system of public prosecutors. The Legislature enacted 
statutory provisions which included the right of the city 
attorney to prosecute in certain limited situations. 
4 
The Constitution says the Legislature shall provide for a 
system of public prosecutors who shall have primary 
responsibility for the prosecution of criminal actions. The 
Court finds that primary responsibility does not mean exclusive 
responsibility. Primary responsibility can be interpreted to 
mean, that it is the first, the principal, the chief or leading 
responsibility of prosecutors to prosecute criminal actions. The 
Court interprets Article VIII, Section 16, to mean that county 
attorneys or the Attorney General, have primary responsibility, 
meaning the full gambit of criminal prosecution. County 
attorneys or the Attorney General must be elected or deputized 
attorneys of an elected prosecutor. 
The Court finds that Article VIII, Section 16, does not 
preclude the Legislature in giving and providing city attorneys, 
who are not elected but simply appointed by their public 
entities, the right to have limited responsibility in 
prosecution. 
The Court finds that the defense has failed to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that §10-3-928 of the Utah Code is 
unconstitutional. 
The Court finds that §10-3-928 is in fact constitutional, 
the Court being able to be bring §10-3-928 within the 
constitutional framework of the provisions of the Utah 
Constitution. 
The motion to dismiss, as advanced by the defense is 
denied. 
5 
Dated this fJPb day of October, 1993. 
Judge Edward A. Watson 
Third Circuit Court Judge 
Approved as to Form: 
Susan M. Denhardt 
Attorney for the Defendant 
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ADDENDUM D 
UhPICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
December 4, 1992 
Mr. David E. Yocom 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
2001 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Subject: Informal Opinion No. 92-16 
H.B. 436 - Authority of City Attorneys 
To Prosecute Under State Law 
Dear Mr. Yocom: 
On behalf of the Advisory Board of the Statewide Association 
of Prosecutors, you have asked our opinion concerning the 
constitutionality of a portion of House Bill 436 (1991 General 
Session) which amended Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 and which 
statutorily authorized city attorneys to prosecute violations of 
certain state laws occurring within the boundaries of their 
municipalities. 
Noting that city attorneys are not elected, you asked whether 
this provision violates Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah 
Constitution which provides that public prosecutors shall be 
elected and shall have primary responsibility for the prosecution 
of criminal actions brought in the name of the State of Utah. You 
indicated that before the passage of H.B. 436, city attorneys had 
been limited in their prosecution duties to prosecuting under city 
ordinances or specific state statutes as provided by the 
legislature, or under authority granted to them by deputization 
from county attorneys. 
Issues and Short Answers 
PRIMARY ISSUE: Is the provision in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 
which authorizes city attorneys to prosecute crimes under state law 
constitutional? 
SHCRT ANSWER: No. 
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SECONDARY ISSUE: Are convictions which have been obtained by 
city prosecutors pursuant to section 10-3-928 nevertheless valid? 
SHORT ANSWER: Yes. 
Analysis 
As amended, Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 reads: 
Attorney duties — Deputy public prosecutor 
In cities with a city attorney, the city 
attorney may prosecute violations of city 
ordinances, and under state law, infractions 
and misdemeanors occurring within the 
boundaries of the municipality and has the 
same powers in respect to the violations as 
are exercised by a county attorney, including, 
but not limited to, granting immunity to 
witnesses . . . 
Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah Constitution provides as 
follows: 
The Legislature shall provide for a system of 
public prosecutors who shall have primary 
responsibility for the prosecution of criminal 
actions brought In the nam§ of the Staze of 
Utah and shall perform such other duties as 
may be provided by statute. Public 
prosecutors shall be elected in a manner 
provided by statute, and sh^ll be admitted to 
practice law in Utah... [emphasis added.] 
The Constitution thus provides that public prosecutors shall 
have primary responsibility for the prosecution of state criminal 
actions, and that such prosecutors must be elected. The 
legislature has provided for such a system of elected public 
prosecutors by establishing county attorneys, who are elected, and 
by vesting prosecutorial authority in the Attorney General, who is 
also elected.1 
xUtah Code Ann. § 67-5-1(5) vests the Attorney General with 
supervisory powers over county attorneys of the srate in all 
matters pertaining to the duties of their offices. There is no 
such provision giving the Attorney General supervisory authority 
over city attorneys. 
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Also, a deputy county attorney may act for the county 
attorney, without violating the constitutional provision that 
elected public prosecutors have primary responsibility, as a county 
attorney can always review a deputy's recommendation and substitute 
the county attorney's own decision for that of the deputy- State 
v. Winne, 189 N.W. 119, 120 (S.D. 1922) ("a deputy state's attorney 
does not fill a new office created by statute, and is not endowed 
with functions usurped from those of the constitutional officer.") 
The problem with section 10-3-928 is that it gives broad 
general authority to city attorneys who are appointed rather than 
elected (Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-902) to exercise the powers of 
public prosecutors by prosecuting infractions and misdemeanors 
under state law} that is, prosecuting in the name of the State of 
Utah. Thus, under section 10-3-928, a city attorney derives the 
power to prosecute state offenses directly from the statute, rather 
than by being a delegee of, and under the supervision of, a public 
prosecutor. 
Indeed, the statute grants prosecutorial authority to a city 
attorney whether or not the county attorney consents. The city 
attorney could decide to prosecute a person whom the county 
attorney would not have prosecuted, or to grant immunity to one to 
whom the county attorney would not have granted immunity, or to 
prosecute as a misdemeanor a case that the county attorney would 
have prosecuted as a felony. These types of decisions are the 
essence of prosecutorial discretion. See 27 C.J.S. District and 
Prosecuting Attorneys § 14(1). State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 402 
(Utah 1989) (prosecutors are given broad discretion in determining 
whether and in what manner to prosecute a case). Further, since 
county attorneys are elected, the people have the authority to vote 
the public prosecutor out of office should they be dissatisfied 
with the decisions of the prosecutor. 
In Ex Parte Corliss, 114 N.W. 962 (N.D. 1907), a state statute 
created an appointed office of "enforcement commissioner" and 
invested the commissioner with all of the common-law and statutory 
powers of elected state's attorneys in the enforcement of state 
liquor laws. The court found the stature unconstitutional, stating 
that it "violates those provisions of our state Constitution by 
which the people reserved the right to have the public functions 
which are attempted to be conferred upon the officers created by 
said act discharged by officers of their own selection." JEci. at 
963. The court also stated that "if these constitutional offices 
can be stripped of a portion of the inherent functions thereof, 
they can be stripped of all such functions, and the same can be 
vested in newly created appointive officers, and the will of the 
framers of the Constitution thereby thwarted." .Id., at 964. 
Numerous jurisdictions have followed the Corliss court's 
rationale. For instance, in Murphy v. Yates, 348 A.2d 837 (Md. 
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App. 1975), the court struck down a statute which created the 
office of state prosecutor as an independent unit in the executive 
branch because it constituted an invasion of the powers and duties 
of the state's attorneys and the Attorney General, in violation of 
the Maryland Constitution. 
The Maryland court enunciated the principle that "if an office 
is created in the Constitution, and specific powers are granted or 
duties imposed by the Constitution, . . . the position can neither 
be abolished by statute nor reduced to impotence by the transfer of 
duties characteristic of the office to another office created by 
the legislature, [citations omitted] We regard this as but another 
facet of the principle of separation of powers, guaranteed by [the 
Maryland Constitution], jrd. at 846. 
The court went on to state: 
We do not find persuasive the contention that 
the duties imposed on the Special Prosecutor 
are concurrent with the powers of the State's 
Attorneys. The simple fact is that the 
Special Prosecutor's power to initiate an 
investigation and to commence prosecution is a 
State's Attorney's most awesome discretionary 
power: to determine whether or not to 
prosecute. . . • Praiseworthy through the 
purpose of the General Assembly might have 
been in enacting the legislation, the result 
can only be validly achieved by a 
constitutional amendment. 
Id. at 848. 
Similarly, in the case of In re House of Representatives, 575 
A.2d 176 (R.I. 1990), the Supreme Court of Rhode Island determined 
that proposed legislation, which would have created a procedure for 
appointing a special prosecutor to investigate and prosecute 
certain crimes, violated that state's constitution by severely 
infringing upon the fundamental constitutional powers of the 
elected Attorney General. Id., at 179-180. 
We find the authorities outlined above to be persuasive and 
well-reasoned. Any person who prosecutes in the name of the State 
of Utah must, according to the Utah Constitution, either be elected 
or be responsible to a public prosecutor who is elected (that is, 
responsible to one who has "primary responsibility" for the 
prosecution of criminal actions brought in the name of the State of 
Utah). A city attorney prosecuting state criminal actions by 
virtue of section 10-3-928 is neither an elected prosecutor nor 
responsible to an elected prosecutor. Indeed, each prosecutorial 
decision made by the non-elected city prosecutor diminishes the 
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authority of the elected county attorney to decide otherwise. 
Consequently, section 10-3-928, which purports to create the power 
to prosecute under state law in a person who is neither elected nor 
responsible to an elected prosecutor, violates the Utah 
Constitution. 
While city attorneys cannot derive power to prosecute in the 
name of the State of Utah directly from statute, county attorneys 
are empowered to deputize city attorneys to conduct such 
prosecutions. For example, Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-111(2) provides 
that a county attorney "may appoint city prosecutors as deputies to 
prosecute state offenses in municipal justice courts." Therefore, 
if a county attorney deputizes a city attorney, then the city 
attorney derives the power to prosecute state offenses from the 
county attorney, and is subordinate to and responsible to the 
county attorney, an elected prosecutor. 
Effect Upon Prior Convictions 
The foregoing opinion raises the issue of what effect, if any, 
the opinion may have upon prior convictions obtained by city 
attorneys acting pursuant to section 10-3-928. We believe that any 
determination that section 10-3-928 is unconstitutional would not 
void any otherwise valid conviction. 
In State v. Gambrell, 814 P. 2d 1136 (Utah App. 1991), the 
defendant claimed that the County Attorney who prosecuted him never 
filed a bond as required by statute, and that he was thus without 
authority to initiate the charges, invalidating the trial court's 
jurisdiction to hear the case. The Utah Court of Appeals 
disagreed, upholding defendant's conviction, stating: 
"Under the de facto doctrine the acts of one 
who assumes official authority and exercises 
duties under color of a valid appointment or 
election are valid where the community 
acquiesces to his authority. The mere failure 
to comply with a technical requirement does 
not void the official's actions as to third 
parties and the public. The acts are valid if 
in the interests of justice." 
Id. at 1139 (citations omitted). Accord, State v. Sawyers, 819 
P.2d 806, 808 (Utah App. 1991). 
A city attorney prosecuting pursuant to section 10-3-928 would 
have been acting "as one who assumes official authority and 
exercises duties under color of a valid appointment where the 
community acquiesces to his authority." Ibid. Further, in the 
absence of section 10-3-928, the city attorneys could have been 
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deputized by county attorneys to try cases in the name of the State 
of Utah. Hence, the fact of not having been appointed by a county 
prosecutor to try these cases can be viewed as a "mere technical 
requirement which does not void the official's actions as to third 
parties and the public." Ibid. 
Third, the convictions obtained by the city attorneys are 
clearly "in the interests of justice." We believe that Gambrell is 
controlling in this instance, and that convictions obtained by city 
attorneys while prosecuting in the name of the State of Utah would, 
if otherwise valid, not be invalid due to having been obtained by 
a city attorney. 
Finally, case law from many other jurisdictions supports the 
proposition that convictions are valid even though obtained by 
prosecutors who may have had defective appointments. 
In People v. Kemplev, 271 P. 478 (Cal. 1928), the court held 
that special counsel for the state who assumed and exercised duties 
of public officer under authorized appointment was an officer de 
facto though not taking oath of office. 
In People v. Montova, 616 P.2d 156 (Colo. App. 1980), the 
defendant contended that his conviction was void because the case 
was prosecuted by deputies of the Attorney General's Office whose 
appointments as special prosecutors for the District Attorney were 
invalid, and therefore the trial court lacked jurisdiction. The 
court held, however, that "even if ineligible as special 
prosecutors, the members of the Attorney General's office acted as 
de facto officers whose authority to prosecute [the defendant] may 
not now be challenged." JCd. at 162. (citing Glavino v. People, 224 
P. 225 (Colo. 1924). 
In State v. Jaramillo, 749 P. 2d 1 (Idaho App. 1987), the 
defendant challenged the validity of the appointment of the deputy 
prosecuting attorney. The court held that under the authority of 
Gasper v. District Court, 264 P.2d 679 (Idaho 1953) [which held, 
inter alia, that where a duty or power is conferred by law on a 
prosecuting attorney in this state, the same duty or power is 
conferred upon his deputies], the prosecutor was, at the time 
relevant to this case, at least a de facto deputy prosecuting 
attorney. In essence, the court said that if an appointment of the 
deputy prosecuting attorney was not filed, he was at least a de 
facto deputy prosecuting attorney. 
In Grace v. State, 201 N.W. 338 (Neb. 1924), a county attorney 
appointed a private attorney to undertake a prosecution, but the 
assistant did not file a bond or take the official oath. The court 
affirmed the conviction, stating that the assistant "held himself 
out as county attorney and performed the duties pertaining to this 
office and was recognized by the public as county attorney, so that 
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he was county attorney de facto." Jto. at 340. 
In Pamanet v. State, 182 N.W.2d 459 (Wise. 1971), a district 
attorney elected in one county served two counties. Though his 
acts were arguably illegal as to the second county, the court held 
that he was, at the very least, an officer de facto, and even if 
his acts were illegal as to the second county's electors, such acts 
were still valid. 
Conclusion 
That portion of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 which purports to 
empower city attorneys, who are not elected prosecutors, to 
prosecute state criminal actions, and to do so without being 
responsible to any elected prosecutor concerning such state 
criminal actions, violates the Utah Constitution. 
Notwithstanding the constitutional deficiency of the statute, 
criminal convictions which have been obtained by city prosecutors 
pursuant to section 10-3-928 are nevertheless valid. 
Very truly yours, 
MICHAEL D. WIMS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Enforcement Division 
CREIGHTON C. HORTON II 
Assistant Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Enforcement Division 
